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THE QUESTION REMAINS: ARE THERE
TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS WHO HAVE A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN
ASSISTANCE IN HASTENING
THE DYING PROCESS
DonaldHi'.Hennann"

The United States Supreme Court can use various formally recognized
devices to avoid making constitutional pronouncements; these include
aspects of justiciability' such as lack of standing2 or ripeness3 and
mootness, 4 or doctrines of judicial restraint such as the political question
doctrine. Sometimes the Court uses rhetorical devices, which often use
procedural aspects of a case, to avoid reaching a decision on a

*Editor-in-Chief,DePaul Journal of Health Care Law. Professor of Law and Philosophy,
Director of the Health Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law. A.B., Stanford
University, 1965; J.D., Columbia University, 1968; LL.M., Harvard University, 1974; MA,
1979; Ph.D. (Philosophy), Northwestern University 1981; M.A.A.H., School of the Art Institute
of Chicago, 1993.
'Justiciabilitydoctrines determine which matters the Supreme Court will hear and decide
and which must be dismissed to (1) conserve judicial resources, (2) limit the power of the
judiciary, (3) improvejudicial decision-making, and (4) promote fairness. ERWIN CHEMEtRNSKiY
FE.DERAL JURIMSDICTION § 2.1 at 42-45 (2d ed. 1994); see e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (196S).
'Whether the specific person is the proper party to bring a particular matter before the
Court for adjudication. CHIEMNSKY, supra note 1, § 2.3 at 53; se lVarth, 422 U.S. at 493
("standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or
a particular set of issues.").
'The Court seeks to avoid matters that are premature for review because the injury is
speculative and may never occur. CHE RINSKY, supra note 1, § 2.4 at 113-14; see Abbot
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
'The mootness doctrine ensures the Court decides an actual controversy in which a dispute
remains between the parties. CHBEMfNSKY, supranote 1, § 2.5 at 125; see United States Parole
Comm. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 3S8 (1980).
sUsing the political question doctrine, the Court will dismiss a case, even though a
Constitutional violation is alleged, and leave the question to the political process for resolution.
CHE MEUNSKY, supranote 1, § 2.6 at 142; see Baker v. Car, 396 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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constitutional question such as addressing an issue different from the one
primarily raised by the litigants before the court. This latter approach was
used by the Court at the end of its 1997 spring term when faced with the

claim that competent terminally-ill patients have a constitutional
right to
6

physician assistance in hastening the dying process.

THE SCOPE OF THE COURT'S DECISION

As a result of grants of certiorari, the Court had before it opinions from the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second7 and Ninth Circuits.8

Litigants in the underlying cases claimed a constitutional right for
terminally-ill patients to physician assistance in hastening the dying
process. 9 Both appellate courts found a constitutional basis for
recognizing this claim.1"

'Quillv. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,731 (2nd Cir. 1996) ("[tlhe New York statutes criminalizing
assisted suicide violate the Equal Protection Clause, because to the extent that they prohibit a
physician from prescribing medications to be self-administered by a mentally competent,
terminally-ill person in the final stages of his terminal illness, they are not rationally related to
any legitimate state interest."); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-794 (9th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("[wje hold that insofar as the Washington statute prohibits physicians from
prescribing life-ending medications for use by terminally-ill, competent adults who wish to hasten
their own deaths, it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amenchnent.')
7
Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'dsub. nom, Quill v. Vacco, 80
F.3d 716 (2d cir. 1996), cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1996).
SCompassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd,
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd, Compassion in Dying
v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. grantedsub nona., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
9See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
("[tjoday, we are required to decide whether a person who is terminally-ill has a constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in hastening ... death."); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,718 (2nd Cir.
1996) ("[tlhe physicians contend that each statute is invalid to the extend that it prohibits them
from acceding to the requests of terminally-ill, mentally competent patients for help in hastening
death.")
1
Quill, 80 F.3d at 727 ("the statutes [criminalizing physician-assisted suicide] lack any
rational basis and are relative of the Equal Protection Clause."); Compassionin Dying, 79 F.3d
at 838 ("[w]e hold that a liberty interest exists in the choice of how and when one dies, and that
the provision of the Washington statute banning assisted suicide, as applied to competent,
teminally-ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths ... violates the Due Process Clause.").
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In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, decided by a
majority of the Ninth Circuit after en banc review, the court held that to
the extent the Washington statute prohibits physicians from prescribing
life-ending medication for use by terminally-ill, competent adults who wish
to hasten their own deaths, the Washington statute violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." A close reading of the
holding reveals the Court narrowly tailored its decision to meet the
situation of "terminally ill" competent patients who wish to "hasten their
own death."

Sinmly, in Quill v. Vacco, the Second Circuit was asked to declare
unconstitutional two New York statutes penalizing assistance in suicide to
the extent the statutes prohibit physicians from meeting requests of
terminally-ill, mentally competent patients for drugs to hasten death.'" The
Second Circuit decided without dissent, that to the extent the New York
statutes c'iminalizing assisted suicide prohibited a physician from
prescribing medications to be self-administered by a mentally competent,
terminally-Ill person in the final stages of the patient's terminal illness, the
statutes were not related to any legitimate state interest and violated the
Equal Protection Clause." As was the case with the Ninth Circuit's
opinion, the Second Circuit narrowly tailored its holding to answer the
question of whether terminally-ill patients have the right to assistance in
hastening their death. 4

Rather than address the narrow question posed by the opinion of the
Ninth Circuit, a majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, accepted the formulation presented by the
petitioner, the State of Washington in the Glucksberg case, that cast the
question presented to be whether the Washington statute prohibiting the
causing or aiding of the suicide of another violated the Fourteenth
"Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 ("[a] person is
guilty of prxnoting a suicide attempt when he Imowngly causes or aids another person to attempt
suicide.').
'Quill, 80 F.3d at 719; N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.15 ('[a] person is guilty of manslaughter
in the second degree then: ...
[h]e intentionally... aids another person to commit sulcide."); N.Y.

PENALLAW § 120.30 ("[a] person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally
aids another person to attempt suicide.").

'Quill, 80 F.3d at 727.
"Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,732 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Amendment of the United States Constitution." Similarly, in his opinion
in Vacco v. Quill, Chief Justice Rehnquist formulated the issue before the
Court to be the question of whether the New York statute prohibiting
assisting suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 16 Posed this way, the issue before the Court far exceeded the
narrow holding of the Second Circuit. Thus, the Chief Justice presented
the broad question of the constitutionality of state criminal law prohibitions
of assisting a suicide; rather than the narrower question of whether
physician-assisted suicide, in the case of terminal patients, is distinguishable
from the Court endorsed practice of acceding to a patient's request for
withholding or withdrawibg of treatment, including nutrition and hydration.
The Chief Justice suggested his reason for formulating the issue more
broadly than the Court of Appeals, is his view that it is not possible to limit
the availability of assistance in suicide to the class of competent terminallyill patients. Instead, the Chief Justice maintained that "what. is couched as
a limited right to 'physician-assisted suicide' is likely to effect, a much
broader license, which could prove extremely difficult to police and
contain."17 This slippery slope argument which the Chief Justice suggests

may lead from "assisted suicide" to "euthanasia" is certainly debatable, but
seldom does such an argument weigh heavily against a claim of
constitutional right.1" Instead, the Court often sets out limits for the

'Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261 (1997).
16

Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2296 (1997).

"Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274.
"Id.
at 2275-76. But see Griswold et al. v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 142
L.Ed. 2d510 (1965) where the United States struck down the 1879 Connecticuit law prohibiting
the sale or use of contraceptives on the basis that this law operated directly on the intimate
relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one respect of that relation. The Court
made its decision despite the argument that its holding could not be limited to married couples,
but would inevitably be extended to unmarried persons. Of course, the Court was correct in its
holding and the critics we correct in their prediction. InEisenstadt v Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.

Ct. 1029, 31 LEd. 3d 349 (1972), the Court determined there was no basis for rationally
distinguishing treatment accorded married and unmarried persons under the state statute
regulation physicians administering or prescribing drugs or articles intended for the prevention
of pregnancy or contraception.
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exercise of rights such as it did in the abortion cases, first with its trimester

analysis19 and now with its pre- and post-viability analysis?'
A cariful reading of the opinions rendered by the various Justices in

these cases makes it clear none of the Justices expressed the position that
the Court's opinions in Washington v. Glucksberg or Vacco v. Quill
provide a final answer to whether there is a right to physician assistance for
a terminal patient wishing to hasten the dying process under all
circumstances. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist carves out space for a
possible claim to such a right. In footnote 24 of his opinion, the Chief
Justice expressed agreement with the view expressed by Justice Stevens
that the Court's opinion does "not foreclose the possibility that an
individual seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor where assistance was
sought, could prevail in a more particularized challenge"; affirmatively, the
Chief Justice stated "[olur opinion does not absolutelyforeclose such a
claim." 21
THE CONCURRING OPINIONS LEAVE
OPEN THE QUESTION OF
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Justice Stevens is very clear in his recognition of the possibility of a future
Court ruling recognizing the right of a terminally-ill patient to physician
assistance in hastening death. Justice Stevens stated: "I write separately
to make it clear that there is also room for further debate about the limits
that the Constitution places on the power of the States to punish the
practice [of physician-assisted suicide]." According to Justice Stevens,
the Court's opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg does nothing more than
determine that the Washington statute prohibiting assisted suicide is not
invalid "on its face"; meaning the statute is constitutional in most of the
situations where it might be applied. However, he points out "[tihat
"Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705,35 LEd. 2d 147 (1973).
2
See Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 120 LEd. 2d 674 (1992).
2
'Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2274 n.24 (emphasis added).
2nWashingtonv. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2302,2304 (1997) (scparate coneurring opinions
for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (Stevens, L,concurring).
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holding, however, does not foreclose the possibility that some application
of the statute might well be invalid."'
Unlike the Chief Justice's opinion which simply adopted the posture
that the Court had before it a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
Washington's criminal statute forbidding assistance to facilitate a suicide,
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion explained the procedural developments
in the case that convinced him to treat the matter as a facial challenge,
rather than a challenge to the application of the statute to the situation of
competent terminally-ill patients wishing to hasten the ding process.
Justice Stevens explained:
As originally filed, this case presented a challenge to the Washington
statute on its face and as it applied to three terminally-ill, mentally
competent patients and to four physicians who treat terminally-ill
patients. After the District Court issued its opinion, holding that the
statute placed an undue burden on the right to commit physicianassisted suicide, the three patients died. Although the Court of
Appeals considered the constitutionality of the statute "as applied to
the prescription of life-ending medication for use by terminally-ill,
competent adult patients who wish to hasten their deaths," the court
did not have before it any individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her
death or any doctor who was threatened with prosecution for
assisting in the suicide of a particular patient; its analysis and
eventual holding that the statute was unconstitutional was not
limited to a particular set of plaintiffs before it. [Citations
omitted].4
The procedural posture of the case, according to Justice Stevens, allowed
the Court to treat the case as one involving a facial challenge to
Washington's criminal statute "addressing not the application of the statute
to a particular set of plaintiffs before it, but the constitutionality of the

'Id. at 2304 [Emphasis added].
24id. (quoting

the majority opinicn ofRelnquist, J.). Rather than reformulating the question

presented by the appeals court opinions, the Court could have invoked doctrines of mootness or

lack of standing. See text and accompanying footnotes 2 and 4.

1997]

THE QUESTION REMAINS

state's categorical prohibition against 'aid[ing] another person to attempt
'
suicide. mZ
Formulating the case as one involving a facial challenge increased the
level of the showing required by respondents necessary to establish the
unconstitutionality of the Washington statute. According to Justice
Stevens, by formulating the question before the Court in this manner, it
becomes necessary for "the plaintiffs to show that the interest in liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 'includes a right to commit
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.""
Justice Stevens readily agreed in his opinion, concurring in the
judgment of the Court, that there is no basis in law supporting an openended constitutional right to assistance in committing suicide.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens made it clear a finding that the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause does not include a categorical "right
to commit suicide, which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,"
and thus, does not reach"the narrow question of the right of a terminallyill competent patient to assistance in hastening the dying process." On
the contrary, Justice Stevens wrote: "[T]here are situations in which an
interest in hastening death is legitimate. Indeed, not only is that interest
sometimes legitimate, I am also convinced that there are times which it is
entitled to constitutionalprotection."'
Justice Stevens suggests there may be differences among terminallyill patients as members of a class permitting some, but precluding others,
from making a claim to a constitutional right to physician assistance in
hastening death. Justice Stevens asserts that "I would not say as a
categorical matter that these state interests are invalid as to the entire class
of terminally-ill, mentally competent patients. I do not, however, foreclose
the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a
doctor whose assistance was sought, could prevail in a more particularized
29
challenge.1

'Id.
at 2305 (separate concurring opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vac¢o
v. Quill)(Stevens, J., concurring).
2Id.

27Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. CL 2302, 2305 (1997).
2Id. [Emphasis added].
29

I. at 2309.
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Justice Stevens suggests that a proper consideration of the Court's
opinions should result in a narrow reading of their holdings. Justice
Stevens provides such a narrow reading when he concludes that in Vacco
v. Quill the Court holds that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by
the New York's classification, just as its holding in Washington v.
Glucksberg that the Washington statute is not invalid on its face, does not
foreclose the possibility that some applications of the New York statute
may impose an intolerable intrusion on a patient's freedom. 30
Justice Breyer suggests the formulation of the issue adopted in the
Court's opinion leaves open the question whether a terminally-ill
competent patient may, under certain circumstances, claim a constitutional
right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process. Justice Breyer
would not limit the issue to the question whether there is a liberty interest
in "physician-assisted suicide,"; on the contrary, he writes "I would not
reject the respondents' claim without considering a different formulation,
for which our legal tradition may provide greater support. This
formulation would use words roughly like a 'right to die with dignity.'31
Justice Breyer goes on to identify three personal interests which may be at
stake in the "right to die with dignity": personal control by the individual
over the manner of one's dying; a right to professional medical assistance
in hastening death; and the avoidance of unnecessary physical pain and
32
suffering.
One circumstance of a terminal competent patient that Justice Breyer
suggests may be sufficient to establish the basis for a claim to a
constitutional right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process
would be persistent,unrelievable,physicalpain andsuffering. According
to Justice Breyer, "the avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with
'
death) would have to comprise an essential part of any successful claim."33

3'Id.
at 2310.
31
Md. at 2311 (separate concurring opinions for both Washington v. Gluiksberg and Vacco
v. Quill)
(Breyer, J., concurring). [Emphasis added].
32
Washington v. GluCksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2311 (1997) (citing concurring opinion of
O'Connor, J.); see Washingtcn v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (1997) (s-.parate concurring
opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (O'Connor, I., concurring).
3
Id. at 2311 (separate concurring opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco
v. Quill)(Breyer, J., concurring).
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Citing the opinion of Justice O'Connor, Justice Breyer reiterates the
observation that the laws of Washington and New York that were before
the Court do not prohibit physicians from providing terminally-ill patients
with drugs sufficient to control pain despite the risk these drugs will hasten
the dying process, or in Justice Breyer's words: "despite the risk that those
drugs themselves will kill.'
Justice O'Connor clearly states that she joined the Court's opinion
"[b]ecause I agree that there is no generalized right to 'commit suicide."'"On the other hand, Justice O'Connor expresses concern for the pain and
suffering experienced by some dying persons. She writes: "For many, the
last days will be spent in physical pain and perhaps [with] the despair that
accompanies physical deterioration and a loss of control of basic bodily and
mental functions. Some will seek medication to alleviate that pain and
other symptoms.""
Justice O'Connor does not accept Justice Breyer's formulation of the
issue before the Court as involving the issue of the "right to die with
dignity." Specifically, Justice O'Connor rejects the respondent's
formulation of the question as "whether a mentally competent person who
is experiencing great suffering has a constitutional interest in controlling
the circumstances of his or her imminent death."
Instead, Justice
O'Connor would state the issue to be "[tihe question whether suffering
patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from
the suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives." 33
After formulating the question at issue as whether competent
terminally-ill patients experiencing unrelievablepain and stiffering have
a constitutional right to physician assistance in relieving that pain by
hastening death, Justice O'Connor finds no need to address the question.
Because the cases before the Court did not involve patients who meet the
qualifying constraints posed by her formulation of the question, Justice

3Id. at

2311 (citing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion at 2303). [Emphasis added].
l6. at 2303 (separate concFring opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco
v. Quill (O'Connor, I., concurring).
3

1Md.

R ashingtmv. Glucksberg, 117 S. CL 2302,2305 (1997) (separate concurring opinions
for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill (O'Connor, ., concurring).
-Id.
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O'Connor avoided the constitutional question altogether. Justice
O'Connor points out that the state laws under review provide that "a
patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing
great pain has no legal barriersto obtainingmedication,,from qualified
physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of causing
unconsciousnessand hastening death."39
Justice O'Connor emphasized the need for state laws to be written
to strike a proper balance between the interests of terminally-ill, mentally
competent individuals who wish to seek physician assistance in ending their
suffering and the state's interests in protecting those who might otherwise
be pressured or misled to end their lives.4"
Justice Breyer expresses his shared view with Justice O'Connor,
noting the need for laws to accommodate the competent, terminally-ill,
suffering patient. Justice Breyer goes on specifically to suggest that if state
laws do not properly accommodate such patients' interests, these laws risk
being found constitutionally flawed.4' While agreeing that neither the
Washington nor New York statutes, on their face, preclude a physician
from providing medication to relieve a terminally-ill patient's suffering to
the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death, Justice Breyer
suggests that were these laws to the contrary, his view of the
constitutionality would differ. Justice Breyer explicitly agreed with Justice
O'Connor that if it can be shown that a state's law does not permit "the
provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as needed
to avoid pain at the end of life -- then the law's impact upon serious and
otherwise unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death) would be more
directly at issue"; and the Court would need "to revisit its conclusion in
these cases.' " 2
3

1d. at 2303. [Emphasis added.]
407d.
41
Id. at 2310-2311 (1997) (separate concurring opinions both Washington v. Glucksberg
and Vacco v. Quill) (Breyer, J., concurring).
4Vashington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2310-2312 (1997); see WAsH. REv. CODE
§§ 9A.36.060(1) (1994), construed in Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261
(1997)("[a] person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids
another person to attempt suicide."); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9A.36.060(l)(c), (2) (1994),
construedinWashington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2261 (1997) ("'[p]r-omoting a suicide

attempt' is a felony, punishable by up to five years' imprisonment and up to a $10,000 fine).
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Justice Souter, perhaps, provided the most compelling explanation for
the Court's avoidance of the narrow question of a competent terminally-ill
patient's right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process. He
suggested uncertainty in how such a right would be implemented and
expressed fear that judicial recognition of such a broad right, without
carefully tailored regulatory legislation, would lead to involuntary

euthanasia and other abuses.43 If the law is to recognize the broad claim
made by respondents, Justice Souter expressed his preference that state
legislatures formulate standards and procedures to accommodate valid

patient interests while protecting vulnerable persons who might be coerced
into physician-assisted death.' 4 However, even Justice Souter suggests the
possible future recognition of a terminally-ill patient's constitutional right
to physician assistance in hastening the dying process.

Justice Souter concluded his opinion with the suggestion that the
Court has actually deferred the decision on the question of whether a
competent terminally-ill patient under certain circumstances has a
constitutional right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process
in order to allow state legislative efforts to craft appropriate statutory law

on the matter.45 According to Justice Souter: "The Court should
accordingly stay its hand to allow reasonable legislative consideration.

While I do not abidefor all time that respondents' claim should not be

43Vashingtoav. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 225S, 2290-2291 (1997) (Souter, J., concuring)..
44MId.
at 2293.
*'Id.
A previous example of the Court deferring final judgment on a constitutional claim
is the Court's decision in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S. CL 2145, 20 LEd. 2d 1254
(1968) where the Court had before it the question of whether a criminal conviction of a person
being found in a state of intoxication in a public place violated the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. While the Court expressed s mpathy for the view
that chronic alcoholism was a disease and not properly a matter for criminal punishment, the
Colot reluctantly refused to strike down state laws punishing public drunkenness. Justice Black's
conmcung opinion sounds a note strikingly similar to that sounded by several of the Justice in
their opinions in the physician-assisted suicide cases. Justice Black v~role: "To adopt this

position [striking down the state statutes] would significantly limit the States in their efforts to
deal with a widespread and important-social problem and would do so by announcing a
revolutionary doctrine of constitutional law that would also tightly restrict state power to deal
with a wide variety of other harmfful conditions." Id. at 2166-67.
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recognized, I acknowledge the legislative institutional competence as the
better one to deal with that claim at this time.'"
JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S REJECTION OF
THE CLAIM TO A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
TO ASSISTED SUICIDE

In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist had Pittle difficulty
finding that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution does not provide
the basis for the claim of a constitutionally protected interest in receiving
or providing assistance in suicide. According to the Chief Justice, there is
nothing in our Nation's history, legal traditions, or practices that provide
any basis for a general right to assistance in suicide. 47 All but two states
make it a crime to assist a suicide; and according to Chief Justice

Rehnquist, almost every western democracy makes it a crime to assist a
suicide. 4' Citing treatise writers such as Bracton49 and Blackstone," the

Chief Justice maintained that for over 700 years, the Anglo-American
common-law tradition punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide
and assisting suicide.5 While the early American colonies p:rovided harsh
penalties including criminal forfeitures and sanctions for suicide, the

movement away from such penalties was not because suicide became
condoned. Rather, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the courts
4Id. at 2293. [Emphasis added.]
41d. at 2263-2264.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263 (citing Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 847 and nn.10-13 (9th Cir. 1996) (Beezer, L, disserting) ("[iln total,
forty-four states, the District of Columbia and two territories prohibit or condemn assisted suicide
...") (citing statutes and cases); Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen-,ral), 107 D.L.R.
(4th) 342, 404 (Can. 1993) ("a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide ... is the norm among
western democracies ...") (discussing assisted-suicide provisions in Austria, Spain, Italy, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and France). Since the Ninth Circuit's
decision, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Iowa have enacted statutory assisted-suicide bans. LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (Supp. 1997); RI. GEN. LAws § 11-60-1, 11-60-3 (Supp. 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 707a.2, 707a.3 (Supp. 1997).
412 BRACTON ON LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 423 (f. 150) (G. Woodbine cd., S.
Thorne transl., 1968), cited in, Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263.
-14W. BiAcKSTONE, CoMMENTARmS *189, cited in, Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263;
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2264.
5
'Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263-64.
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continued to condemn suicide as a grave public offense, but simply cai
to the conclusion that it was unfair to punish a the family of a person w
committed suicide for the person's wrongdoing.'
Early state laws prohibited suicide and made anyone who assisti
suicide subject to the charge of murder as a principal offender. 3 Ti
consent of the person committing suicide was wholly immaterial t
determining the guilt of the person charged with homicide.'
No:
according to the Chief Justice, was there any exception for the terminally
I1Y In 1828, New York adopted the first state statute explicitly outlawin.
assisting suicide. 6 At the time of ratification of the Fourteentt
Anndment, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, most states had made it a
crime to assist a suicide?5'
While some commentators see physician-assisted suicide as a logical
extension of recent legal recognition of living wills, surrogate decision
making for health care, and provisions for withdrawal or withholding of
life-sustaining medical treatment, the Chief Justice disagrees.' According
to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the very fact of the legal recognition of the endof-life reasures invokes an explicit rejection of physician-assisted suicide.
Chief Justice Rehnquist cites several states' legislative experience with this
subject; specifically he refers to the history of the Washington legislation
on withdrawal and withholding of treatment:
The Washington statute at issue in the case, WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.36.060 (1994) was enacted in 1975 as part of a revision of that
state's criminal code. Four years later, Washington passed its
Natural Death Act, which specifically stated that the "withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment ...
shall not, for any
%kLat 2265 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5, Comnment 5,p. 100 (Offiial Draft and
Revised Comments 1980)).
9d.
'l (citing MODELPENAL CODE § 210.5, Comment 5,p. 100 (Official Draft and Reisted

Comments 1980)).
1MId.

5Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2265 (1997).

5MId.
5
1d. at 2265-66,; see also Note, Physician-AssistedSuicide and the Right to Die vth

Assistance, 105 Harv. L Rev. 2021, 2040 (1992) C[phsician.assisted suicide is not
fundmaentally different from the withholding of medical treatment').
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purpose, constitute a suicide" and that "[nlothing in this chapter
shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing
...
" Natural DeathAct, 1979 WASH. LAWS, ch. 112, §§ 8(1), p. 1
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.070 (1), 70.122.100
(1994). In 1991, Washington voters rejected a ballot initiative
which, had it passed, would have permitted a form of physician
assisted suicide. Washington then added a provision to the Natural
Death Act expressly excluding physician-assisted suicide. 1992
WASH. LAWS, ch. 98, § 10; WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.100

(1994)." 9
While it could be argued that the 1994 successful ballot initiative in
Dregon, the "Death With Dignity Act" legalizing physician-assisted suicide
for competent, terminally-ill adults, reflects a growing social acceptance of
physician-assisted suicide, the Chief Justice again holds a contrary view.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist minimizes the significance of the Oregon Initiative
by countering it with the fact that no state legislature has adopted a
proposal to legalize assisted suicide. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist points
out that two states recently adopted statutes explicitly prohibiting assisted
suicide; moreover, Congress passed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding
Restriction Act in 1977 prohibiting the use of federal funds to support
physician-assisted suicide. 61 For the Chief Justice, the only positive
significance of the Oregon Initiative is that it exemplifies state activity

59

Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2266.
6'Id.at 2266. Timothy Egan, Assisted Suicide Comes FullCircle, to Oregon, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1997 at Al. It should be noted that the Oregon law was itself the subject of protracted
litigation. Lee v. Oregcn, 107 F.3d 1382 (91h Cir. 1997), rev'g Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429
(D. Ore. 1995), Lee v. Oregn, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Ore. 1995), cert. denied Lee v. Hareleroad,
No. 96-1824,1997, WL274930 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1997). Even though the Oregon initiative passed,
the Oregon legislature resubmitted the matter to the Oregon voters in the fall of 19)7. It should
be noted that the initial voter initiative in Oregon in 1994 passed by 51 percent lo 49 percent.
The law submitted to the voters in 1997 authorizing physician-assisted suicide received an
approval vote by 60 percent of the voters. See Right to Die:In Oregon, Opening a New Front in
the World of Medicine,N.Y. TIMs, November 6, 1997, p. A22, col. 1. See also J. Graham & J.
Peres, Assisted-Suicide Door Opens Wide, CHGO TPJB., November 6, 1997, sec. 1, p. 1, col. 2
and p. 27, col. 1.
6Id. at 2266 citing IOWA CODE ANN.§§ 707A.2, (Supp. 1997); R.I GEN. LAWS §§ 11.60-1,
11-60-3 (Suppl 1996) and PUB.L 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 14401).
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addressing the issue of physician-assisted
suicide in the proper political
62
courts.
federal
the
in
forum, rather than
As one familiar with the Court's opinions over the last decade might
expect, there is no mention of the right of privacy as a relevant factor in
Justice Rehnquist's opinion.63 Instead the Chief Justice considers the
question before the Court with reference solely to the liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause.
Citing Cruzanv. Director,MissouriDep't of Health, the Chief Justice
observes: "We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due
Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment." 6 Yet, the Chief Justice expresses his usual strong
reluctance to expanding the "concept of substantive due process" by
recognizing a new "asserted right or liberty interest" because: (1) judicial
recognition of a claimed right places the underlying issue outside the arena
of public debate and legislative action; and (2) the Court should refuse to
transform the policy preferences of the Justices into newly recognized
constitutional rights. 65
The Chief Justice takes issue with the position of Justice Souter who
would ask "whether [Washington's] statute sets up one of those 'arbitrary
impositions' or, purposeless restraints' at odds with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 According to Justice Rehnquist
this approach would be far too open ended and involve the Court in an
endless process of balancing competing interests of citizens and state
authority. The Chief Justice insists analysis should be directed at the
question of whether "a challenged action implicate[s] a fundamental right,"

qGlucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2266-2667.
'See Anita L Allen, Autonomy's Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional
Interpretation,72 B.U. L REV. 683,686 (1992); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191
(1985) (the court did not use a privacy analysis as one might have expected, instead, the court

only held that consensual sodomy between homosexuals was not a fundamental right).
'Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2667 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S.
261,278-79 (1990)).
6sId. at 2267-2268.

"Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. CL 2302, 2268, 2269 (1997) (citing the opinion of
Justice Souter, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543, 81 S. CL 1752,

1776-1777 (1961) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
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i.e., a carefully described fundamental right or liberty interest which is
objectively "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 67
The Chief Justice presents his version of the "'careful description' of
the respondents' claim" in these terms: "The question presented in this
case, however, is whether the protections of the Due Process Clause
include a right to commit suicide with another's assistance.."6 For the
litigants in this case, a careful description of their claim :may be more
properly stated as the right of competent, terminally-ill patients to
physician assistance in hastening the dying process. Nevertheless, taking
the Chief Justice's "careful description" of the litigant's claim, the next step
is to "inquire whether this asserted right has any place in our Nation's
traditions."6' 9 The final step is to determine whether the state law
prohibiting assisted suicide is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. After a review of the history of the law dealing with suicide, the
Chief Justice easily concluded that, rather than finding a recognition of
assisted suicide as part of the nation's legal tradition, there has been an
"almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and
continues
to reject it today, even for terminally-ill, mentally competent
70
adults."
Despite the apparent tight logic of this approach and the easy disposal
of the claim to a right to assisted suicide, the Chief Justice, nevertheless,
goes on to address previous opinions of the Court cited by proponents of
the recognition of a competent terminally-ill patient's right to assisted
suicide, to establish that there is a basis in American law for recognition of
such a right. Specifically, the Chief Justice makes a strong effort to
distinguish Cruzan and to show that the respondents' understanding of the
Court's opinion in Cruzan is flawed. The Chief Justice points out that "for
purposes of [that] case, we assume[d] that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition." 71 Justice Rehnquist then proceeds to

67d. at 2268.
d. at 2269.
69

1d. at 2270.

70

Id. at 2269-2270.
'Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2270 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279, 110
S.Ct. at 2852).
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provide a very narrow reading of the holding in Cruzan, stating, 'We
concluded that, notwithstanding this [assumed] right, the Constitution
permitted Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent patient's wishes concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment."72
The Chief Justice is adamant in rejecting the respondents' claim that
the recognition of the right to physician-assisted suicide is implicit in the
Cruzan holding. According to Rehnquist, there is no basis in the reasoning
or holding in Cruzan which supports the view that Cruzan "applies at least
as strongly to the choice to hasten impending death by consuming lethal
medications" as it does to decisions to refuse death delaying treatment. 3
Rehnquist rejects even more vehemently the Ninth Circuit's reading of the
holding in Cruzan that it "necessarily recognize[d] a liberty interest in
hastening one's own death." 4 According to the Chief Justice, the holding
in Cruzan was based on a "long legal tradition protecting the decision to
refuse unwanted medical treatments" while respondents' claim of a right
"to commit suicide with the assistance of another ...
has never enjoyed
similar legal protection."75 The Chief Justice also points out that in the
Cruzan opinion, recognition was given to the fact that most states
prohibited assisted suicide. Further, Justice Rehnquist states "we certainly
gave no intimation that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment
could be somehow transmuted into a right to assistance in committing
suicide.

' 76

The Chief Justice also faulted respondents' reliance on Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey in which the Supreme Court affirmed its earlier
decision in Roe v. Wade holding, in part, that a woman has a right before
her fetus is viable to an abortion without interference from the State. 7 The
Ninth Circuit, according to the Chief Justice, misconstrued the language
in Casey that stated many of the rights and liberties recognized under the
Due Process Clause "involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a
72Id. (citing Cruzan at 280-281, 110 S. CL at 2852-2853.
73

Mi.
d.
Id. at 2269-2270.
76
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2270.
7'Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)).
74
75
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' The Ninth Circuit found this language
person may make in a lifetime."78
"almost prescriptive" of the conclusion that "the decision how and where
to die is one of the most intimate and personal choices a person may make

in a lifetime."79 The respondents also misconstrued the meaning of Casey,

according to the Chief Justice, when they argued: "[a]t the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence."' On the contrary,
the Chief Justice opines: 'That many of the rights and wishes protected by
the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal
decisions are so protected." 81
The Chief Justice turned his attention to the final step of a Due
Process analysis: scrutiny of a state law requiring any regulation to be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.8' The. Chief Justice
identifies what he considers to be four valid state interests in prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide:
(1) The state has an unqualified interest in the preservation of all human
life. In pursuing its interest in preserving human life, the state may
with good reason properly decline to make judgments about the
quality of life that a particular individual may enjoy. Moreover, the
state may reasonably assume that recognition of physician-assisted
suicide would make it more difficult to protect depressed or mentally
ill persons, or those who are suffering from untreated pain, from
suicidal impulses.83
(2) The state has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession. The state may reasonably act on the assumption
that recognizing physician-assisted suicide could undermine the trust
essential to the physician-patient relationship.'M

'Id. at 2270-2271 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813-14 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
79
1d.at 2271.
'Id. at 2271 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).

"821Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2269-2 at 2272.
83

d. at 2271.
d at 2272-2273.

8Id. at

2273.
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(3) The state has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups including the
poor, the elderly, and disabled persons. The state may reasonably act
on the assumption that physician-assisted suicide poses profound risks
to ill and vulnerable persons who are terminally-ill, disabled or elderly
including coercion to accept physician-assisted suicide and
stigmatization of the ill and dying that may be implicit in a policy that
permits physician-assisted suicide.'
(4) The state may properly fear that recognition of physician-assisted
suicide will lead to the practice of voluntary and involuntary
S6
euthanasia
In making the case for the validity of these asserted state interests, the
Chief Justice places questionable reliance on his interpretation of various
published reports and studies concerning matters related to physicianassisted suicide. For example, Justice Rehnquist cites a report of the New
York State's Task Force on Life and the Law for the proposition that
"Those who attempt suicide - terminally-ill or not - often suffer from
depression or other mental disorders."' Justice Rehnquist also cites a
report made to a House Subcommittee on the issue of physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia in the Netherlands for the proposition:
"[I]ntolerable physical symptoms are not the reason most patients request
physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia. 'S The Chief Justice concluded
that research indicates that many people who request assisted suicide
withdraw that request if their depression and pain are treated.") It is not
clear, however, that all competent terminally-ill patients who desire
85

Id. at 2273-2274 (1997) (citing WHEN D&ATH IS SOUGHT: AssbsTE SuicIB AND
EUANIAILNTHEmEDICAL CoNmXT 13-22, 126-28 (New York State Task Force of Life and
the Law, 1994)).
' 117 S. Ct. at 2273 (quoting Black, et al., Physician-AssistcdSuicide andEuthanasiain

WashingtonState, 275 JAMA 919, 924 (1996)).
LTGlucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273 (citing WHEN DP-ATH S SOUGH: AssISTE SuIC DE AIm
EuTrHANAsIA iN THE IMEDICAL CoNTExr 175 (New York State Task Force of Life and the Law,
1994)).
'Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274 (quoting Physician-AssistcdSuicide andE uthanasia in
the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T Canady to the Subcommittee on the
Constitutionof the House Committee on the Judiciary,104th Cong. 12-13 (1996)).
89

Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. At 2273 (citing H. HENDN, SEDuCED BY DmATH: DOCTORS,

PATIENTS AND nm DUTcH CuaE 24-25 (1997).
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physician assistance in hastening the dying process are clinically mentally
depressed. It may be true that a state law regulating physician-assisted
suicide should properly require a determination and documentation in the
medical record that a patient is not acting out of depression when
requesting physician-assisted suicide; but the fact that some terminally-ill
patients may be clinically depressed and not competent is not a sufficient
reason to deny decision making capacity to nondepressed, competent,
terminally-ill patients.
Finally, the Chief Justice again cites the New York State Task Force
for the proposition: "physicians and medical professionals often fail to
respond adequately to serious ill patient's needs."' ° It may be granted
there is a need to improve the quality of pain management rendered by a
health care provider. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that pain
management is only one of the personal interests at stake in the claim of
competent terminally-ill patients to physician assistance in hastening the
dying process. These patients also have interests in dying with dignity, in
avoiding unnecessary conditions of dependency and helplessness, and
exercising their autonomy in the dying process.
To support his view that recognition of physician-assisted suicide will
lead to involuntary euthanasia, the Chief Justice places heavy reliance on
an account of the Netherlands experience with physician-assisted suicide
reporting that revealed a large number of cases involving lethal morphine
overdoses without the patients' explicit consent. According to this report,
these abuses occurred despite regulations limiting prosecutional tolerance
of physician assistance in providing lethal medication to cases involving an
explicit patient request.9 While the Dutch experience merits study, it is by
no means clear that the Dutch experience would be reproduced in the
United States. Abortion has been practiced widely in China with many
reported abuses including abortion for sex selection; it is clear, however,
that abortion practice in the United States has not been characterized by
these same abuses.92

"Id. at 2293.
91
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274.

12See ChineseAbortingFemaleFetuses, CHGo TRIB. (Oct. 17, 1997) at A13, see 1, col. 1.
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In his opinion in Vacco v. Quill, the Chief Justice considered the
Second Circuit's finding of a denial of Equal Protection in the application
of New York's law banning physician-assisted suicide.93 The Second
Circuit found the practice of withdrawal or withholding of treatment
leading to death to be equivalent to physician-assisted suicide.' Thus, the
Second Circuit found a denial of Equal Protection; because those in the
final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems are allowed
to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but those
who are similarly situated, except for the lack of previous attachment of
life-sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by selfadministering prescribed drugs.95 The Second Circuit found no rational
basis for the state's differing treatment of mentally competent terminally-ill
patients who want life-support removed in order to hasten the dying
process and those who wish to be administered a lethal dose of medication
in order to hasten the dying process.
The Chief Justice found the New York statute, by its terms, did not
infringe on any fundamental right, nor did it involve suspect
classifications.' Justice Rehnquist concluded that the distinction made in
New York between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment is a distinction widely endorsed and recognized by the legal
tradition and the medical profession based on principles of causation and
intent.
The issue of causation is first addressed by the Chief Justice: "[W]hen
a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an
underlying fatal disease or pathology;, but if a patient ingests lethal
medication prescribed by a physician, he is killed by the medication."' 7 It
would seem straightforward to recognize that when nutrition and hydration
are withheld, a patient will die from starvation or dehydration unless
another cause of death intervenes. Moreover, when medications are
administered to facilitate death by starvation or dehydration, it would seem
clear that those medications are administered as part of a process to
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997).
'Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
95Id. at 728.
Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2297-2298.
17Id. at 2298.
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facilitate the death of the patient. However, the Chief Justice chooses to
cite the opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Materof Conroy
for a more indirect explanation that "when the feeding tube is removed,
death' result[s] ... from [the patient's] underlying medical condition."'98 It
is true the underlying medical condition is the cause of the patient's
inability to obtain nutrition or hydration without mechanical assistance;
nonetheless, it remains true that death will be directly caused. by starvation
and dehydration if nutrition and hydration are withheld or withdrawn.
According to the Chief Justice, the issue of intent is even more
significant in distinguishing physician conduct in withholding or
withdrawing treatment and physician-assisted suicide. The Chief Justice
maintains the intent of the physician in withdrawing or withholding is to
honor a patient's initial wish, and the physician intends only "to cease
doing useless and futile or degrading things to a patient when [the patient]
no longer stands to benefit from them. ' Contrastingly, the physician who
provides a patient lethal medication, directly intends to assist in causing
the patient's death.1l°
Justice Rehnquist does not seem to entertain the possibility that in
providing a patient lethal medication, the physician may intend only to
meet the patient's request for such medication without any intent or desire
that the patient use or not use the medication to cause death. Nor does he
consider the possibility that the physician may intend to, or know to a
certainty, that his action will cause the patient's death when the physician
withdraws treatment, including nutrition and hydration.
JUSTICE SOUTER'S ANALYSIS OF THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE STATE'S INTEREST IN
PROTECTING VULNERABLE PATIENTS BY PROHIBITING
ASSISTED SUICIDE
Justice Souter's opinion provides an alternative analysis to that
provided by the Chief Justice, while at the same time providing a much

"Id. at 2299 (citing Matter of Conroy, 98 N.L 321,355,586 A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985).
99d. at 2298.

id. at 2299.
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narrower formulation of the issue before the Court. According to Justice
Souter, "the question is whether a state statute making it a crime to aid

another person to attempt suicide sets up one of the 'arbitrary impositions'
or 'pointless restraints' at odds with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. °' Justice Souter is willing to answer the
narrower question of whether it would violate substantive due process to
enforce a criminal statute prohibiting assisted suicide against a physician
who acceded to a dying patient's request for a drug to be taken by the
patient to commit suicide.'

Justice Souter sets out to determine what the respondents must show
to establish their claim that the Washington statute deprives them of a right
falling within the scope of liberty under the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. According to Justice Souter, the respondents
have a very heavy burden to meet when claiming the state has "no
substantively adequate justification for barring the assistance sought by the
patient and sought to be offered by the physician" to hasten the patient's
death.103

Justice Souter provides a scholarly and detailed evaluation of the
doctrine of substantive due process from the early Eighteenth Century
onward. He finds himself in strong agreement with the dissent of Justice
Harlan in Poe v. Ullman that when faced with a claim based on substantive
due process, the task is not to identify an absolute right outside the text of
the Constitution, but to engage in judicial scrutiny of the legislative
resolution of "clashing principles, each quite possibly worthy in and of
itself, but each to be weighed within the history of our values as a
people." 1 Instead of viewing the task as one of finding some historically
based right, much less identification of mere judicial preference for
recognition of some claim of right, the Court must make an examination
of a state's legislation or regulation to determine whether it is without
justification.
According to Justice Souter, appropriate judicial review should not
"substitute one reasonable resolution of the contending positions for
101Washington

v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (Souter, J., co-tcurring).

0

Id. at 2277.
..Id.at 2277.
1

01Id. at 2281 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,543 (1961) (Harlan, J., disscnting)).
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another," but should be restricted to replacing "the balance already struck
between the contenders only when it falls outside the realm of
reasonable."1"5 Thus, a liberty claim like that posed by the respondents, is
a claim of right to be free from "arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints.""
Justice Souter identifies various elements of the Due Process analysis
that establish the burdens which advocates for recognition of a
constitutional right must meet. Justice Souter points out,
When identifying and assessing the competing interests of liberty
and authority, for example, the breadth and expression that a litigant
or a judge selects in stating the competing principles will have much

to do with the outcome and may be dispositive. As in any process
of rational augmentation, we recognize that when a generally
accepted principle is challenged, the broader the attack, the less
likely it is to succeed."07

This approach leads Justice Souter to a narrower formulation of the
question than that provided by the Chief Justice. Yet, Justice Souter
recognizes such a narrow formulation may be untenable if it mistakenly
presumes conditions or constraints which make it impossible to
accommodate the valid concerns of the state regulation. Indeed, according
to Justice Souter, it is likely these concerns will be clear in a broader
formulation of the interests at stake. Justice Souter provides his
formulation of the claims made by the parties in this case by refusing to
term it as a general claim for anyone to assist in any suicide, under any
circumstances, namely the right of physicians to provide competent,
terminally-ill patients assistance in hastening the dying process. Rather,
Justice Souter presents the claim as involving the right of a narrow class
(i.e., physicians] to help others in a narrow class (i.e., competent
terminally-ill patients) under a set of limited circumstances. However,
Justice Souter also notes the claimants are met with the State's assertion

I SId"
"Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2282 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
C d. at 2284.

1 7
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that recognizing such a narrow scope of rights jeopardizes individuals
whom the state may concededly protect through its regulations."t
Justice Souter recognizes that neither the patients' claim to physician
assistance in obtaining counsel and imdication to be administered to hasten
death, nor the physicians' claim of a right to provide such aid, are
historically based. Instead, Souter views the case as involving the claim of
patients to access the services of a physician to give them the benefit of
advice and medical help, which is said to enjoy a tradition so strong and so
devoid of specifically countervailing state concern that denial of a
physician's help in these circumstances is arbitrary when physicians are
generally free to advise and aid those who exercise other rights to bodily
autonomy.9
Justice Souter identifies three bases for establishing the claim to a
right of competent terminally-iU patients to physician assistance in
hastening the dying process:
(1) The states don
of suicide reflects a social rejection of the
tradition that abhorred and condemned suicide. Moreover, the state's
rejection of the traditional criminal law prohibition of suicide raises
the question as to the criminality of assisting suicide that previously
would not have been considered.
(2) The state's decriminalization of suicide suggests a recognition of
rights of bodily autonomy which may be exercised in conduct that the
state may still wish to discourage.
(3) The claim being made for a competent terminally-ill patient to
physician assistance in hastening the dying process is rooted in the
traditional right to medical care and advice subject to the explicit
conditions of informed responsible choice when death is imminent.
Justice Souter places significance on the fact that Washington
decriminalized suicide, while continuing to prohibit assistance to one
committing suicide." 0 Although he rejects the argument that

" Id. at 2286 (Souter, L, concurring).
d.

10

1111d. at 2287.
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decriminalization implies the recognition by the state of a liberty interest
in suicide, Justice Souter does acknowledge decriminalization "opens the
door to the assertion of a cognizable liberty interest in bodily integrity and
associated medical care that would otherwise have been in apposite so long
as suicide, as well as assisting a suicide, was a criminal offense....
Common law recognition of the right to be free from medical
invasions into the body, as well as a right to refuse medication are readily
acknowledged by Justice Souter. Unlike Justice Rehnquist, Justice Souter
agrees with respondents that the Court's decisions in Cruzan and Casey
have significance for determining the question of the right to physicianassisted suicide."' Both the right to require physicians to terminate
artificial life support.. and the right to obtain medical intervention to cause
abortion1 4 are based, according to Justice Souter, on constitutional
recognition of the right of bodily integrity.1 This analysis leads Justice
Souter to recognize that the claim to physician assistance in hastening the
dying process falls within the accepted tradition of medical care.
There are strong analogies between physician assistance in hastening
the dying process and physician assistance in obtaining an abortion that are
recognized by Justice Souter:
Even though the State has a legitimate interest in discouraging
abortion. The Court recognized a woman's right to a physician's
counsel and care. Like the decision to commit suicide, the decision
to abort potential life can be made irresponsibly and under the
influence of others, and yet the Court has held in the abortion cases
that physicians are fit assistants. Without physician assistance in
abortion, the woman's right would have too often amounted to
nothing more than a right to self-mutilation, and without a physician
to assist in the suicide of the dying, the patient's right will often be
confined to crude methods of causing death, most shocling and
painful to the decedent's survivors ....
[ln the course of holding that
the decision to perform an abortion called for a physician's
"'Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2284 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
"'Id.
at 2288; compare, id. at 2270 (majority opinion Justice Rehnquit).
13id. at 2288 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)).
" 41d. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)).

"'Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2288 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
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assistance, the Court recognized that the good physician is not just
a mechanic of the human body whose services have no bearing on
a person's moral choices, but one who does more than treat
symptoms, one who ministers to the patient." 6
Thus, Justice Souter suggests respondents make a valid argument for their
asserted interest in a right to physician-assisted suicide. Moreover, he
suggests there is a counter argument to the position that recognition of
physician-assisted suicide right would compromise the integrity and ethics
of the medical profession. According to Justice Souter, a physician who
provides assistance in hastening the dying process may be viewed as basic
to the physician-patient relationship,
This idea of the physician as serving the whole person is a source of
the high value traditionally placed on the medical relationship. Its
value is surely as apparent here as in the abortion cases, for just as
the decision about abortion is not directed to correcting some
pathology, so the decision in which a dying patient seeks help is not
so limited." 7

Unlike Justice O'Connor who views the principal concern of
respondents to be pain management,"s and more like Justice Breyer who
would formulate the respondents claim to be one to the right to die with
dignity," 9 Justice Souter sees the respondent s' claim to be a complex
interest in avoiding pain, achieving death with dignity, and maintaining
personal autonomy:
The patients here sought not only an end to pain (which they might
have had although perhaps at the price of a stupor) but an end to
their short remaining lives with a dignity that they believed would be
denied them by powerful pain medication, as well as by their
consciousness of dependency and helplessness as they approached
U6Id. at 2288 [Citations omitted].
"7 1d. at 2289.

UsWashington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, 3., cancurring).
.. gid. at 2311. (separate concurring opinions for Washington v. Glucksberg and Quill v.
Vacco) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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death. In that period when the end is imminent, they said, the
decision to end life is the closest to decisions that are generally
accepted as proper instances of exercising autonomy over one's own
body, instances recognized under the Constitution and the State's
own law, instances in which the help of physicians is accepted as
falling within the traditional norm. 1'0
Justice Souter goes on to identify three situations where physicians are able
to act that are similar to the situation in which the respondents are asking
for physician assistance. Primarily, physicians may withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment and terminate artificial delivery of nutrition and
hydration to patients who request their physician to do so, even though the
physicians action will undoubtedly hasten death. Secondly, physicians may
alleviate the anxiety and discomfort of patients whose life-sustaining
treatment is withdrawn or whose nutrition and hydration is withheld by
administering medication that will hasten death further. And finally,
physicians may administer medication to terminal patients with the intent
to alleviate pain, even when that medication will have the effect of
hastening the patient's death.
Justice Souter is unequivocal in recognizing the strength of the claim
of a competent terminal patient to physician assistance in hastening the
dying process: 'There can be no stronger claim to a physician's assistance
than at the time when death is imminent, a moral judgment implied by the
State's own recognition of the legitimacy of medical procedures necessarily
hastening the moment of impending death."' 2'
In stark contrast to Justice Rehnquist who finds no basis for a claim
of a competent terminal patient to physician assistance in hastening the
dying process," Justice Souter finds that the respondents have made a
strong showing to establish their claim."z
Nonetheless, it is the
application of the second part of the due process analysis that bring Justice
Souter conclusion that the respondents failed to establish a lack of
sufficiency in the state's reasons for refusing to recognize the respondent's

"Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2289 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
127d. at 2290.
'2Jd. at 2271.
1
231d. at 2290 (Souter, ., concurring).
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claim to a right to physician assistance in hastening death. While Justice
Souter admits it "cannot be gainsaid" that the respondents' claim falls,
"within that class of 'certain interests' demanding careful scrutiny of the
state's contrary claim," he concludes that the State's interests weighed
against the formulation of the claim made by the respondents "are
sufficiently serious to defeat the present claim that [the state's law] is
arbitrary or purposeless." 24
Significantly Justice Souter expresses an important caveat to this
analysis leaving open the possibility of future litigation establishing a
patient's right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process under
particular circumstances. Specifically, Justice Souter recognized the Court
might find that "interest might in some circumstances, or at some time, be
seen as 'fundamental' to be degree entitled to prevail"
For the present, Justice Souter identifies three state interests that
compel him to find that Washington law prohibiting assisting suicide as
applied to physicians treating competent terminally-ill patients is not an
arbitrary or a purposeless restriction. The interests include:
(1) protecting life,
(2) discouraging suicide, and
(3) protecting terminally-ill patients from mistakenly and involuntarily
deciding to end their lives, and guarding against both voluntary and
involuntary euthanasia. 6
Without analyzing the first two interests, Souter concludes the third
interests is dispositive given the formulation of the respondent's claim that
was presented to the Court through litigation arising outside of the
context of a system of statutes or regulations setting out procedures and
standards controlling the practice of physician-assisted suicide.
Justice Souter identifies various reasons for giving significant weight
to the state's interest in protecting terminally-ill patients:

'-41d.

"\Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2290 (1997) (Souter, L,convurring).
rId.
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(1) difficulty in identifying a clear standard for imminent death;
(2) possibility of mistaken decisions resulting from inadequate palliative
care;
(3) possibility of erroneous determination of terminal prognosis;
(4) possibility of coercion and abuse stemming from the high cost of
medical care;
(5) temptations for physicians to administer voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia because of failure to identify patient's preference, or out
of mistaken compassion;
(6) obscuring of the line between ill and dying;
(7) blurring the boundary between those responsibly deciding and those
unduly influenced. "
According to Justice Souter, the significance of the State's interests stems
from the showing that "respondent's claim is not as narrow as it sounds,
simply because no recognition of the interest they assert could be limited
to vindicating those interests and affecting no others." 1
The underlying premise of Justice Souter's conclusion that the state's
interest outweighs the respondent's claim is simply that the need of the
state to protect vulnerable patients can only be achieved through the
present general prohibition of suicide, and no statute regulating physician
suicide could be drafted to effectively protect vulnerable persons the state
has a proper interest in protecting. The contextual setting of this case
permits Justice Souter's conclusion. Without a statute or set of regulations
establishing standards and procedures for the practice of physician-assisted
suicide, every abuse is arguably conceivable.
Respondents made a general claim of a right to physician assistance
in hastening the dying process at the request of terminally-ill patients.
Respondent's provided a general challenge to laws prohibiting suicide as
applied to the situation of the competent terminally-ill patients.
Respondent's position in the cases before the court left the determination
of when and how to provide assistance to patients wishing to hasten the
dying process to the physicians providing the assistance. Of course the
lzId. at 2290-93.
1

2Id. at 2290.

1997]

THE QUESTION REMAINS

475

Court itself could formlate standards for exercising the right to physician
assistance in hastening the dying process as the Court has done in the
abortion cases.' It is obvious that the Court was reluctant to take such an
affirmative course of action in these cases with the result that assisted
suicide would have involved implicit recognition of a system of physician
self-regulation in providing assistance in hastening patients' death.
The way the cases before the Court were fiarnd implicitly presumed
a system of physician self-regulation in providing assistance to patients
wishing to commit suicide. Without a regulatory law setting down
standards or procedures for physician-assisted suicide (including standards
for: diagnosis, independent confirmation of diagnosis, psychological
evaluation of the patients, criteria for diagnosis a terminal condition), it is
easy to understand why Justice Souter was convinced that the state's
interest in protecting vulnerable patient's would be jeopardized by a ruling
in favor of the respondents. To avoid risk to vulnerable person, if the
Court were to recognize a right to physician-assisted suicide, the Court
would be forced to independently impose limits and requirements for
exercise of the rights claimed by respondents.13
The respondents placed heavy reliance on physician self-regulation to
generate the kind of standards and procedures that would otherwise be
provided by a regulatory law. Conversely, the State argued dependance
on the vigilance of physicians was insufficient. Justice Souter contrasted
the self-limiting nature of the Court's discussions in the contraception
cases 31 and the medical basis of the standards set out in the abortion
cases'32 to what he described to be as an open-ended matter of assessing
"the knowing and responsible mind" of a terminal patient. 13 3 Thus, Justice
Souter concluded it was beyond the competence of the Court to set out the
conditions and limitation on the exercise of a right of patients to physicianassisted suicide.

2'Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 LEd. 2d 147 (1973).
'1-Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2290 (1997) (Souter, L, concurrin).
mid. at 2291 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Planned Parenthccd v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).

L'Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2291 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Roe v. Wada, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)).
toId. at 2291.
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Justice Souter also was convinced that in the long :run, physicians
would not necessarily be committed to assiduously maintaining the narrow
line suggested by respondents' formulation. Several factors were identified
by Justice Souter as supporting the slippery slope argument that
recognition of a right to physician assistance in hastening the, dying process
would likely lead to euthanasia:
(1) compassion might lead a physician to providing assistance to a
patient, whether the patient was technically responsible or not;
(2) financial incentives, especially in the managed care situation, might
lead to inappropriate physician action;
(3) possible shift by an attending physician from providing lethal drugs to
administering such rnedication. 3 4
Two possible responses to Justice Souter's analysis are anticipated by
him: judicial establishment of requirements for the exercise of a
circumscribed right to physician-assisted suicide and legislative regulation
of the practice of physician-assisted suicide. Could not the. Court set out
standards and procedures for regulating this process as it has done in such
differing situations as abortion135 and the questioning of criminal
suspects?' Justice Souter clearly recognizes such previous efforts of the
Courts, particularly in the abortion cases. Nonetheless, Justice Souter
concludes that there is something unique about the determination of patient
preferences by physicians with mixed motives. According to Justice
Souter, "The case for the slippery slope is fairly made out here, not
because recognizing one due process right would leave a court with no
principled basis to avoid recognizing another, but because there is a
plausible case that the right claimed would not be readily containable by
reference to facts about the mind that are matters of difficull: judgment, or
by gatekeepers who are subject to temptation, noble or not. ' ' 137
Id.
Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2291; see also Roe v. Wide, 410 U.S. 113

3

(1973).
'Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2291 (Souter, J., concurring).; see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
wGlucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2291.
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Justice Souter acknowledges the suggestion of respondents that the
State's interest in protecting vulnerable patients could be vindicated by
carefully drafted regulations providing standards and procedures for
physician-assisted suicide. The suggestion calls for state legislation
authorizing physician-assisted suicide which would require two qualified
physicians to confirm a patient's diagnosis, prognosis, and competence.' 3
Further, the suggested legislation would mandate that the patient make
repeated requests witnessed by at least two others over a specific time
span; and would impose reporting requirements and criminal penalties for
various acts of coercion.'39 Nevertheless, Justice Souter remained
unconvinced that the Court was in any position to determine that such
recomrrmnded standards and procedures would be sufficient to guarantee
the state's interest in protecting vulnerable persons.
Unlike Justice Rehnquist whose opinion cites only negative reports
about of the Netherlands's experience with physician-assisted suicide as
evidence of the inevitable movement from physician-assisted suicide to
euthanasia,' Justice Souter more cautiously cites conflicting reports about
the claimed failure of the Dutch procedures to protect vulnerable and
unconsenting patients."' Justice Souter also cited reports that indicate
there have not been substantial incidents of physician abuse or noncompliance with mandated guidelines in the Netherlands. 2 Yet, the
existence of a factual disagreement about the Dutch experience with

'Id.(citing amicus curiae brief on behalf on members of the New York and Washington
state legislatures in support of petitions (Nos. 95-1858, 96-1110)).
Id.(citing amicus curiae brief on behalf of members of the New York and Washington

state legislatures in support of petitioners (Nos. 95-1858, 96-1110)).
"Washingtoa v.Glucksberg, 117 S.C. 2258, 2274 (citing Physician-AssistcdSuicide and
Euthanasiain the Netherlands:A Report of ChairmanCharlesT. Canady to the Subcommittee
on the Constitutionof the House Committee on the Judiciary 104$aCong. 12-13 (1996).
'Ild.at 2292 (citing I. Keown, Euthanasiain the Netherlands:Sliding Don the Slippery
Slope, in EUTHANASIA ExAuNrED 261, 2S9 (1995); C. GoMEZ, REGULATING DpamT 102-113

(1991).
.. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing &.EPsMhJN, 1ORAL PME 322 (1997) (Dutch
physicians are not euthanasia enthusiasts and they are slow to practice it in individual ca.es).
R. POsER, AGING AND OLD AGE 242, n.23 (1995) (noting fear of "doctor's rushing patients to
death" in the Netherlands "has not been substantiated and does not appear rcalistic)); Van der
Weh, et aL, EuthanasiaandAssistedSuicide2, DoDutch Family DoctorsAct Prudently?2 Fto,.
PRACT.135 (1992) (finding no serious abuse in Dutch experience).
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physician-assisted suicide weighs heavily for Justice Souter in deciding the
significance to be given to the state's claim of the need for its present law
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. In fact, for Justice Souter, the
' 143
conflicting reports are "dispositve of the due process claim at this time.
It needs to be emphasized the essential determining influence for
accepting the state's claim of an inability to protect vulnerable patients
without maintaining the law prohibiting assisted suicide, without exception,
turns on the conflicting arguments about the inability of the state to effect
its interest in protecting vulnerable persons with regulatory, rather than
prohibiting legislation. According to Justice Souter:
The capacity of the State to protect the others if respondents were
to prevail is, however, subject to some genuine question,
underscored by the responsible disagreement over the basic facts of
the Dutch experience. This factual controversy is not open to a
judicial resolution with any substantial degree of assurance at this
time .... At this point, however, the factual issue at the heart of this
case does not appear to be one of those [settled in a couat]. The
principal inquiry at the moment is the Dutch experience and I
question whether an independent front-line investigation into the
facts of a foreign country's legal administration can be soundly
undertaken through American courtroom litigation. While an
extensive literature on any subject can raise the hopes for judicial
understanding, the literature on this subject is only nascent. Since
there is little experience directly bearing on the issue, the most that
can be said is that whatever way the Court might rule today, events
could overtake its assumption, as experimentation in some
jurisdictions confirmed or discredited the concerns about progression
from assisted suicide to euthanasia.'"
Justice Souter does not suggest the Court should refuse to recognize
a right to physician-assisted suicide on some absolutist narrow reading of
the Constitution, because such an approach would require the Court to
defer to the legislature on any question regarding a right not specifically set

"Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2292 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
d. at 2292, 2293.

144
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out in the text of the Constitution. Instead, Justice Souter suggests that in
this case, only through experimentation facilitated by state legislation can
the case be made for a narrowly circumscribed procedure which allows
competent terminally-ill patients to seek physician assistance in hastening
the dying process while preventing the exposure of other vulnerable
patients to physician abuse in coerced suicide or euthanasia." 5 Justice
Souter does point out that state legislatures have the ability, unlike the
courts, to resolve the factual controversy underlying the conflict between
the respondent's claim and the state's interest. Citing the experience of the
State of Oregon and its legislative initiative providing for physician-assisted
suicide as evidence of the likelihood of desirable legislative
experimentation in this area: "Not only do [legislatures] have more flexible
mechanisms for factfinding then the Judiciary, but their mechanisms include
the power to experiment, moving forward and pulling lack as facts emerge
within their own jurisdictions."' 46
Of course the question remains whether state legislatures will be bold
enough to adopt legislation providing procedures and standards regulating
physician-assisted suicide. Even the Oregon experience reveals the timidity
of state legislatures in addressing this matter. After the Oregon voters
passed an initiative providing for physician-assisted suicide, the Oregon
legislature required the electorate to revote on the matter. 47 Justice
Souter, however, warns that legislative inaction may compel the Court to
address patients' claims of a right to physician-assisted suicide, and then,
for the Court by itself to set out the parameters for the exercise of such a
right. Justice Souter writes: "I do not decide here what the significance
might be of legislative foot - dragging in ascertaining the facts going to the
State's argument that the right in question could not be confined as
claimed. Sometimes a court may be bound to act regardless of the

"4Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
1

'6d. at 2292 (Souter, J., concurring) ( citing OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-897 (1996)).

'See, eg., T. Eagan,Assited Suicide Comes Full Circlein Oregon,N.Y. TE.Ms, Oct. 26,
1997, at Al, col. 2 and A19, col. 1. The Oregon initiative, passed three years aZo (1994) by 51
percent to 49 percent, allows doctors to prescribe a lethal dose of medications to terminally-ill
patients who are of sound mind and have made a written request to die. Even as the law was
snagged in cant, the Oregon state legislature worked to stall its implementation, sending the act
back to the people for repeal at Al.
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institutional preferability of the political branches as formed for addressing
constitution claims."' 4

While Justice Souter clearly prefers state legislation to address and
resolve the matter of effective regulation of physician-assisted suicide, he
leaves the door open to future consideration by the Court of the question
whether under certain circumstances a competent terminal patient has a
right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process. Justice Souter

concludes: 'The Court should accordingly stay its hand to allow reasonable
legislative consideration. While I do not decide for all time that
respondent'sclaim should not be recognized,I acknowledge the legislative
institutional
competence as the better one to deal with that claim at this
'
time.' 149

JUSTICE STEVENS SUGGESTS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO HASTEN DEATH UNDER
PARTICULARIZED CIRCUMSTANCES
Justice Stevens agrees with the Court's opinion that there is not a

categorical constitutional "right to commit suicide which it;elf includes a
right to assistance in doing so."' 0 Nonetheless, Justice Stevens would
have the Court recognize there are situations in which an interest in
hastening death is legitimate.' Justice Stevens goes on to suggest a
constitutional right to hasten death under particularized circumstances; by
writing: "Indeed, not only is that interest sometimes legitimate, I am also
convinced that there are times when it is entitled to constitutional
' 2
protection.'
Justice Stevens first attempts to show that the states have not
maintained an absolute interest in preserving life by their practice of capital
punishment. Citing three 1976 opinions of the United States Supreme
Court on the question of constitutionality of the practice of capital

148GIucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring).
1491d.[Emphasis added].

'°Washingtcav. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302,2305 (1997) (separate concurring opinions
for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill)(Stevens, J., concurrin3).
15
7d.
152

1d.
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punishment, 3 Justice Stevens points out, "[1n those cases we concluded
that a State does have the power to place a lesser value on some lives than
on others; there is no absolute requirement that a State treat all human life
as having an equal right to preservation."'
Justice Stevens finds a second aspect of the capital punishment cases
to be instructive in suggesting a broad finding that there is no categorical
right to assist suicide does not preclude a narrower finding of exceptions
to that rule. Justice Stevens writes: "[J]ust as our conclusion that capital
punishment is not always unconstitutional did not preclude later decisions
holding that it is sometimes imperrnissibly cruel, so is it equally clear that
a decision upholding a general statutory prohibition of assisted suicide does
not mean that every possible application of the statute would be valid."" 5
Turning his attention to the Court's decision in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, Justice Stevens does not regard that
decision as recognizing an absolute right of a patient to refuse treatment.
In support of this assertion, Stevens cites legislation imposing punishment
on persons refusing to be vaccinated. 5 and cites with approval, Justice
Scalia's observation in Cruzan that the state would ordinarily have the
right to interfere with an attempt to commit suicide by acting to stop the
blood flow from a person with a self-inflicted wound.1"
On the other hand, Justice Stevens would not give Cruzan the narrow
reading given it by Justice Rehnquist.SS Instead, Justice Stevens views

i at 2304 nn.l-3 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 156, (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 420
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
LM. at 2304 (separate concurring opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vcaco
v. Quill) (Stevens, L, concurring).
"SWashington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2305 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
' 56M. at 2306 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 312 n.12
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905)).
5

7Gucksberg, 117 S. CL at 2306 (1997) (separate concurring opinions for both
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill)(Stevens, J., concurring)(citing Cruzan, 497 U.S.

at 298 (Scalia, J., concuning)).
mWashington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258, 2270 (1997) ("[tlhe decision to conmit
suicide with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the dceisica to
refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection .... In

Cruzan itselt we recognized that most States cotlawed assisted suicide - and even more do toay
- and we certainly gave no intimation that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could
be somehow transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide.").
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Cruzan as supporting a narrow claim of a patient to assistance in hastening
the dying process.' 9 Justice Stevens points out that Cruzan did not
involve a patient with an illness that would respond to the normal course
of medical treatment, and he emphasizes the significance of the
"irreversible nature of her illness" and "the progressive character of her
'
suffering. '
For Justice Stevens, the Cruzan opinion was not simply a case of
judicial vindication of a patient's right to refuse medical freatment, but
further, Cruzan recognized a patient's broader "interest in refusing medical
care [that] was incidental to her more basic interest in controlling the
manner and timing of her death."'' Justice Stevens is quite specific in his
recognition that the Court, "in essence, authorized affirmative conduct that
would hasten her death."' 6
Justice Stevens suggests that the Cruzan opinion has important
implications for considering the claim that competent terminal patients
have a right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process under
certain circumstances. In fact, Justice Stevens, suggests the original
patient plaintiffs in the physician-assisted suicide cases might have a
stronger claim than Nancy Cruzan, because they were terminally-ill and
suffering severe and constant pain.'63 Justice Stevens suggests several
important implications of the Cruzan opinion for the present cases:
(1) Cruzandid not involve simply the exercise of a common law right to
refuse treatment; but a "freedom [that] embraces, not merely a
person's right to refuse a particular kind of unwanted treatment, but
also her interest in dignity, and in determining the character of the
memories that will survive long after her death"; it involved "the even
more fundamental right to make this 'deeply personal decision."64

'9Washingtonv.Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302,2306 (1997) (separate corcurring opinions
for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill)(Stevens, J., concurrin,3).
16
DId.
161Id.
1
6Id.

.Id,
at 2306-07.
"'Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2306 (1997) (separate concurring opinions
for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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(2) Cruzan recognized a "liberty interest" in refusing unwanted medical
treatment that is protected by the Due Process clause that outweighed
any relevant state interest.165
(3) The sphere of liberty protecting the right to have treatment withheld
or withdrawn includes the protection of matters "central to personal
dignity and autonomy." According to Justice Stevens, "[t]he Cruzan
case demonstrated that some state intrusions on the right to decide
how death will be encountered are also intolerable." 1' '
While conceding that the Cruzan opinion does not decide the issues
presented to the Court in cases involving physician-assisted suicide, Justice
Stevens is equally sure the Cnzan opinion did give recognition to an
autonomy interest in "madng decisions about how to confront an imminent
167
death.
Justice Stevens offers his reading of the significance of the Cruzan
case for resolving the narrow question of the right of competent terminallyill patients to physician assistance in hastening the dying process under
specific circumstances:
Although there is no absolute right to physician-assisted suicide,
Cruzan makes it clear that some indvidualswho no longerhave the
option of deciding whether to live or to die because they are
already on the thresholdof death have a constitutionallyprotected
interestthat may outveigh the State's interest in preserving life at
all costs. The liberty interest at stake in a case like this differs from,
and is stronger than, both the common-law right to refuse medical
treatment and the unbridled interest in deciding whether to live or
die. It is an interest in deciding how, rather than whether, a critical
threshold shall be crossed.169
Using the same analytical approach as set out by Justice Souter," 9 yet
establishing a much stronger claim by patients to physician-assisted suicide
'6Id.
65Id. at 2307.
167Id.
1

6Id. [Emphasis added].
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 225S, 2290-93 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
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than that developed by Justice Souter,' 70 various state interests are set out
and evaluated by Justice Stevens. These include the state's interest in
preserving ife, in preventing suicide, and in maintaining the integrity of the
medical profession.
Justice Stevens maintains that the state interest in preserving life is not
the same in all cases. Specifically, Justice Stevens recognizes that the
state's interest may be outweighed by the interest of a person in hastening
death in circumstances "because of pain, incapacity, or sedation [she] finds
172
her life intolerable.
Justice Stevens does not anticipate physician-assisted suicide will be
chosen by all terminally-ill and pain suffering patients, and he willingly
concedes many terminally-ill patients may find life meaningful despite pain
or dependence. According to Justice Stevens, some individuals find value
in suffering; some wish to live to witness particular events; and others have
religious scruples against hastening the dying process. 73 However, Justice

Stevens also recognizes that some terminal patients will not wish to
continue treatment, and some terminal patients will wish to hasten dying.174
According to Justice Stevens: "[t]here are those who will want to continue
aggressive treatment; those who would prefer terminal sedation; and those
who will seek withdrawal from life-support systems and death by gradual
starvation and dehydration."' 75 Rejecting Justice Rehnquist's suggestion
that recognition of physician-assisted suicide devalues the lives of the
terminally-ill,' 76 Justice Stevens instead asserts "it gives proper recognition
to the individual's interest in choosing a final chapter that accords with her
life story, rather than one that demeans her values and poisons memories
7
of her.'

17

170
° d.
171

at 2292.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2307-09 (1997) (separate concurring

opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (Stevens, J., concurring).
'721d.at 2308.
173Id.
174

Id.

1751d.
176

Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2273 (1997).

mnWashington v. Glueksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2302, 2308 (1997) (separate concurring opinions

for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (Stevens, L,concurring).
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While conceding a general state interest in preventing suicide, Justice
Stevens maintains that in the context of the terminally-ill suffering patient,
the state's interest in preventing suicide is less significant."7 Justice
Stevens suggests measures can be taken to prevent coercion, to diagnose
depression, and to treat depression and pain. Moreover, according to
Justice Stevens, an individual who is not suffering from depression and
who makes a rational, voluntary decision to seek assistance in dying is not
victimized. If these measures are taken, Justice Stevens maintains the state
interest in preventing physician-assisted suicide significantly lessens.
Accordingly, he writes: "[The State's legitimate interest in preventing
abuse does not apply to an individual who is not victimized by abuse, who
is not suffering from depression, and who makes a rational and voluntary
decision to seek assistance in dying."17' 9

Recognizing the state's interest in preserving the traditional integrity
of the medical profession, Justice Stevens warns against too narrow a view
of the physician as "healer." On the contrary, Justice Stevens notes "for
sorm patients, it would be a physician's refusal to dispense medication to
ease their suffering and make their death tolerable and dignified that would
be inconsistent with the healing role.""' 'S Moreover, since physicians are

already involved in decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment that
results in hastening death, there may already be a significant change in the
understanding of the role of the physician.'
Justice Stevens concedes that the distinction between permitting death
to ensue from an underlying fatal disease and causing it to occur by the
administration of medication or other means provides a constitutionally
significant basis for distinguishing the refusal of treatment and a request for
physician-assisted suicide." Significantly, Justice Stevens does not
directly recognize the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration
may be the cause death, although he acknowledges earlier in his opinion
that sone patients may seek "death by gradual starvation and

17

1d.

"Id.
'11d. at 2309.
'Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2309-10 (1997) (separate concurring

opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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dehydration."' Justice Stevens, instead, suggests that the distinction may
be illusory, because, "Iam not persuaded that in all cases there will in fact
be a significant difference between the intent of the physicians, the patients
or the families in the two situations."' 184
Justice Rehnquist maintains a physician's intent is necessarily different
in withholding or withdrawing treatment (the physician's intent is to
comply with the patient's stated desire) and in providing the patient a lethal
dose of medication (the physician's intent is to cause the patient's
death).1 Justice Stevens properly suggests the intent of a person may be
the same in the withholding/withdrawal situation and the physician-assisted
suicide situation because patients in both situations may intend to hasten
death and a physician in either case may simply intend to comply with the
patient's6 stated desire, or alternatively may wish to assist in hastening
18
death.
Much is made in the opinions of Justice O'Connor 1 and Justice
Breyer"u about the need to provide palliative care in the form of
medication for pain relief even to the extent that such m=dication will
hasten or cause death. Justice Stevens, however, suggests that recognition
of a right to pain relief through medication that may hasten or cause death
ultimately blurs the distinction between physician-assisted suicide, and
permitting death to take place.189 Justice Stevens writes:
The illusory character of any differences in intent or causation is
confirmed by the fact that the American Medical Association
unequivocally endorses the practice of terminal sedation -- the
administration of sufficient dosages of pain-killing medication to
terminally-ill patients to protect them from excruciating pin even
183d. at 2308.
1

"Id. at 2310.
'IVacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2298-99 (1997).
1s6washingtonv. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302,2310 (1997) (separate concurring opinions
for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (Stevens, I., concurrirg).
"SId.at 2303 (separate concurring opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco
v.Quill) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"Id.at 2311-12 (separate concurring opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and
Vacco v. Quill) (Breyer, J., concurring).
"Id.
at 2310 (separate coneturing opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco
v. Quill) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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when it is clear that the time of death will be advanced. The
purpose of terminalsedation is to ease the suffering of the patient
and comply with her wishes, and the actualcause of death is the
administrationof heavy doses oflethal sedatives. This same intent
and causationmay exist when a doctor complies with a patient's
requestfor lethalmedication to hasten her death."
Justice Stevens comes to the conclusion that although the differences
between intent and causation in the situation of treatment termination and
the situation of physician-assisted suicide may support Justice Rehnquist's
analysis of a facial challenge to a state's law prohibiting assisted suicide,'91
the distinctions may be inapplicable when considering the claim. of a
terminally-ill patient to physician assistance in hastening the dying
process.' 92
Justice Stevens finds the state's interest in prohibiting assisted suicide
will not always outweigh the underrated liberty interest of a particular
patient to physician assistance in hastening the dying process."' While
rejecting the categorical claim that the state's interests are invalid as to the
entire class of competent patients, Justice Stevens concludes that "I do
not, however,foreclose the possibility that an individualplaintiffseeking
to hasten her death, or a doctor whose assistance was sought, could
prevail in a more particularizedchallenge.""
THE FUTURE OF THE QUEST FOR RECOGNITION
OF A RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN ASSISTANCE IN
HASTENING THE DYING PROCESS
The various opinions of the Justices in these cases anticipate that the
debate about physician-assisted suicide will continue in the legislatures and
the courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, made it clear

1

"Id.[Emphasis added.]
.9 1Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2302 (1997).

192Md"
' Id.
..Id at 2309 (separate ctcurring opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco
v. Quill) (Stevens, J., concurring). [Emphasis added.]

488

DEPAuL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 1:445

that such continued debate leading to the establishment of circumscribed
procedures and standards for physician-assisted suicide is in no way
precluded by the Court's opinions. The Chief Justice concludes his opinion
with the observation that, "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged
in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate
to continue, as it should in a democratic society." 95
Justice Souter is firmin his conviction that the state legislatures must
address the issue of whether the claim of patients under circumscribed
conditions for physician assistance in hastening the dying process can be
accommodated without jeopardizing the state's interest in protecting
vulnerable persons. He goes even further to raise the possibility that
legislative inaction may necessitate the Court's reconsidering the question
of physician-assisted suicide. As Justice Souter warns, "I do not decide
here what the significance might be of legislative foot-dragging in
ascertaining the facts going to the State's argument that the right in
question could not be confined as claimed. Sometimes a court may be
bound to act regardless of the institutional preferability of the political
branches as forums for addressing constitutional claims."'" It is clear that
Justice Souter views as valid the interest of properly qualified patients to
physician assistance in hastening the dying process. Further, although he
prefers that the legislatures develop a statutory scheme to accommodate
this interest, Justice Souter does not rule out judicial recognition of a
patient's right to assistance in hastening death, in the event of legislative
inaction. Justice Souter concludes his opinion with the observation, "The
Court should accordingly stay its hand to allow reasonable legislative
consideration. While I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim
should not be recognized, I acknowledge the legislative institutional
competence as the better one to deal with that claim at this time."' 97
Justice O'Connor not only recognizes the current activity of state
legislatures addressing the issue of physician-assisted suicide, but she also
endorses striking a balance between the interests of patients suffering from

1
'Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
1
1Id. at 2293 (Souter, L,concurring).
9

"Id. (Souter, L concuring).

2275 (1997).
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terminal illness and the state's interest in protecting vulnerable populations.
Justice O'Connor writes, "Every one of us at some time may be affected
by our own or a family member's terminal illness. There is no reason to
think the democratic process will not strike the proper balance between the
interests of terminally-ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek
to end their suffering and this State's interests in protecting those who
might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure."1 3 In concluding her
observation, Justice O'Connor notes, "States are presently undertaking
extensive and serious evaluation of physician-assisted suicide ... [ifn such
circumstances, 'the ... challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures
for safeguarding ... liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the
States ... in the first instance."' 199
The Court's opinions make it clear there is no constitutional
prohibition or obstacle to state enactment of laws providing for physicianassisted suicide. The Court's recent ruling in Lee v. Harcleroadgave tacit
recognition to the appropriateness of state legislation establishing the right
to physician-assisted suicide 2' by turning down an appeal from the Ninth
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit had ordered dismissal of a lawsuit brought by
physicians and patients who sought an injunction to prevent the Oregon
Death With Dignity Act from going into effect20 1
While it is not within the scope of this article to set out all of the
specifies of a proper statute establishing and regulating physician-assisting
suicide, certain fundamental elements of such a legislation can be identified.
In developing a law providing for patients to receive physician assistance
in hastening the dying process, requirements need to be established to
ensure that the patient's request is informed and voluntary. Primary care
physicians should be required to discuss all feasible alternatives with the

lWashingtonv. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (1997) (separate concurring opHin=ci
for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1
"Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri DepL of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

"Leev. Harcleroad, No. 96-1824, 1997 WL274930 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1997) (mcmcrandum
opinion denying certiorari).

'Leev. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'g Lee v. Oregon, 91 F. Supp. 1429
(D. Or. 1995), Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995); sce OR. REV. STAT." 127.800 897 (1996) (the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Ballot Measure 16).
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dying patient including the full extent of available palliative care and pain
relief, and the availability of hospital care.
The patient should be required to make repeated requests for
physician assistance. The patient should be required to make at least one
written request and at least one subsequent oral request. To insure careful
consideration of the matter by the patient, an oral request should be
required to be made at least ten days after the written request. The patient
should be required to be told of the ability to revoke the :request at any
time and in any manner.
A law providing for competent terminally-ill patients to receive
physician assistance in hastening death needs to establish eligibility criteria
for such assistance. It is basic to such a law that it requires the
establishment of a terminal and irreversible disease or condition that is
reasonably expected, according to established medical criteria, to produce
death within a given period, perhaps within a six month period, in order for
a patient to qualify for physician-assisted suicide. Such a law should
require at least two qualified physicians to confirm the patient's diagnosis
and prognosis. The medical record should document the physicians'
determinations, as well as the fact that all written and oral requests by the
patient are voluntary, by providing a record of all counseling sessions and
the offer of the attending physician to rescind the patient's request.
A statute providing for physician-assisted suicide should require a
determination for eligibility through an evaluation of the patient by a
mental health specialist to determine competence and absence of clinical
depression. This determination should be confirmed by a second mental
health specialist.
A procedure should be established to authenticate a patient's request
for physician assistance in hastening the dying process. This might include
a requirement of at least two repeated requests witnessed by two persons,
not related to the patient and not members of the health care team treating
the patient.
A statute regulating physician-assisted suicide should prohibit making
insurance benefits or health care services contingent on the patient's
request for physician-assisted suicide. The statute should include reporting
requirements and criminal penalties for acts of coercion or duress, and for
failure to comply with the requirements of the statute.
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In developing a statute governing physician-assisted suicide, it would
also be desirable for legislatures to consider giving attention to the problem
of palliative care and pain control by requiring that these alternatives be
provided to a patient for a stated period before the option of physicianassisted suicide could be considered.
Of course, the possibility of future litigation remains, as indicated by
a number of the Justices who suggested that in a case involving
particularized qualifying conditions, the Court might grant recognition of
a claim to a right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process.
Justice Stevens specifically endorsed the possibility of vindication of a
patient's claim to physician-assisted suicide under certain circumstances.
Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice Stevens' position in footnote 24 of
the Courts opinion where he wrote: "Our opinion does not absolutely
foreclose such a claim." 2
Justice Souter perhaps would find a broader constitutional claim by
patients to physician-assisted suicide if the state's interest in protecting
vulnerable patients could be achieved while accommodating the claim of
patients to physician assistance in hastening the dying process. Justice
Souter clearly states: "I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim
3
should not be recognized.

'2

Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Bryer identify the kind of special
circumstances that might allow a competent terminal patient to prevail in
a claim to a right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process.
Justice O'Connor maintains that since the Court only considered facial
challenges to the Washington and New York statutes, there was no need
to reach the question whether "a mentally competent person who is
experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in
controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death." 2' On the
other hand, Justice Breyer maintains a state's law would be
unconstitutional if it could be shown "to prevent the provision of palliative
care, including the administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the

'Wasbington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 n.24 (1997).
'Id. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring).

ZXVashingtcxiv. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302,2303 (1997) (separate concurring opinios
for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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end of life." 5 Establishment of the inadequency of palliative care to
relieve pain should be sufficient to meet the requirement of the special
circumstances for a patient to prevail in a claim to a right to physicianassisted sucide. According to Justice Breyer: "[ln my view, the avoidance
of severe physical pain (connected with death) would have to compromise
an essential part of any successful claim '"2 6
Advocates for patients seeking physician assistance in the dying
process may prevail if they are able to develop a body of evidence showing
the limits of palliative care in relieving suffering fall short of relieving
significant pain of particular terminal patients. Such advocates will need
to show that certain competent terminally-ill patients do, in fact, suffer
unrelieveable pain if these advocates wish to establish a constitutional right
to physician-assisted suicide under the rubric of the various opinions issued
in Washington v. Glucksberg. °7
It is certainly beyond the scope of this article to develop an empirical
case for the assertion that some patients suffer unreievable pain;
nevertheless, it is clear there are reports in the medical literature that such
is the case. In response to the assertion that most physical pain can be
relieved with the appropriate use of analogistic agents, a physician reported
in the NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE: 'This is certainly far from
my own experience, and I have observed that dysphoria and other terrible
sensations may persist despite vigorous and innovative attempts to control
them. In addition, many dying patients must also endure the nausea,
dysphoria, and helplessness caused by their treatments.""2 '

'Id. at 2312 (separate concuring opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco
v. Quill) (Breyer, J., concurring).
2Id.
at 2311.
2
n7Washington v. GluCksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) ("[wM . need not weigh
exactingly the relative strengths of these various interests ... [o]ur holding today permits this
debate to continue ..."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2311 (1997) (separate
concurring opinions for both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill) (Breyer, L,
concurring) ("I would not reject respondents' claim without considering ...
the avoidance of
unnecessary and severe physical suffering ..."); Id. at 2310 (Stevens, J., concurring) (there is a
liberty interest "that may justify the only possible means of ... alleviating [a dying patient's]
intolerable suffering.").
anRichard Finley, EuthanasiaDebate [Letter], 323 NEw ENG. 3. OF MED. 1771 (1990).
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Despite the possibility of future litigation and vindication of
competent terminal patients under some circumstances to a constitutional
right to physician assistance in hastening the dying process, one can expect
that the question of whether, and under what circumstances competent
patients have a right to physician-assisted suicide is now a matter that will
be debated before state legisatures m and will be a likely subject of future
voter initiatives.

'According to the Hemlock Society, fifteen states (including Alaska, Arizona, California,

Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, finois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, and Vermont) have considered legislation which would have
permitted terminally-ill patients the right to die. See Hemlock Sooe.ty, Lcgislative Matters:
Update on LegislativeAction by State Law (as of August, 1997) <http:/Iwww2.privateLcom
/hemlock/legislate.html>.
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